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The latter part of the twentieth century has seen a marked acceleration in
the rate of progress in the area of transplant research . The world of 1998 is
one in which it is possible to transplant hearts, kidneys, lungs, livers,
corneas and even neural cells from one human body to another.
Transplants involving some organs from animals, and even synthetic
organs, have also been achieved, with beneficial and sometimes spectacular
results. It is therefore not surprising that, since Dr. Christiaan Barnard
performed the world's first heart transplant operation just.over 30 years ago
and placed the issue firmly in the public eye, a great many questions
concerning the ethics of such procedures have been raised and actively
debated. From our perspective at the end of the twentieth century, it would
appear that the first exultant acclamations of these life-saving and lifeenhancing procedures have given way to a more circumspect examination
of the potential disadvantages which might accompany their
implementation. This clearly has significant implications for the rights of
the donor to bodily integrity and respect, and the rights of the recipient to
avail of the most advanced treatments for his or her particular condition. If
the issue of adult human transplants has been a source of disagreement in
ethical and medical circles in recent years, it is clearly overshadowed by
the degree of controversy which surrounds the issue of fetal tissue
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transplants . For here we are not dealing with the adult human person who
is the proud possessor of long-recognized soc ietal and legal rights but with
a class of persons whose standing has been severely diminished by decades
of legal and political indifference and hostility. Thus, although the issue of
fetal ti ssue transplants may not appear to be related to the issue of abortion,
this article will attempt to demon strate how many aspects of the latter
debate are pe rceptible in the former. A numbe r of relevant opinions on the
matter will be reviewed, many of which relate to the findings of the Human
Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research (HFTTR) Panel, convened at the
National In stitutes of Hea lth in 1988 . In addition , we will investigate
whether, in view of the substantial body of abortion-related research
currently being conducted, there exists a morally acceptable and
medicall y/economica ll y via ble meth od of us ing human fetal ti ss ue to aid in
transplant research.

HFTTR - The Report
The HFTTR panel first met in public sess ion in September of 1988
to di scuss th e ethics of fetal ti ss ue transplants, six month s after the U.S.
Assistant Secretary for Health, Robert Windom , had declared a moratorium
on any federal funding of such transplants involving ti ssue obtained from
induced abortions. Mr. Windom posed a numbe r of questi o ns to the pane l,
most of which concerned the re lati onship between the collection of fetal
tissue a nd the abortion procedures from which that tissue was obtained. By
December of that same year, after hearing legal , ethical and sociological
testim ony from invited speakers a nd public interest groups, the panel filed
its report . One of its authors, James C hildress, notes in hi s account of the
proceedings that th e panel advocated a lifting of the morato rium on federal
funding for fetal tissue tran splants and the impl e mentation of a number of
" safeguards" which it believed would " separate as much as possible the
pregnant woman ' s deci s ion to abort from her deci s ion to donate fetal tissue
following the abortion ." J In addition , the panel believed that these
regulation s would prevent any complicity on the part of ti ssue collection
agencies in the preceding act of abortion. Of the twenty-one panel
members (ethicists, lawyers, biomedical researchers, clinical physicians,
public policy experts and religious leade rs), four filed dissents. This
di ssent was based on a belief in the immorality of abortion and in the
related immorality of complicity with thi s moral evil. We must therefore
examine in greater detail this question of complicity.
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HFTTR - The Dissent
James Bopp, Jr., a dissenting member of the panel, describes in The
Fetal Tissue Issue how the question of complicity with past abortions has
arisen because of principles enunciated during the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trial, concerning the doctors who used human remains obtained from
concentration camps for their various experiments. These doctors were
condemned for having " taken a consenting part,,2 in the crimes carried out
at the camps inasmuch as they were fully aware of these atrocities and their
research benefited as a result of these acts. By way of comparison, Bopp
describes how, in 1988, Dr. Curt Freed spent four days in an abortion clinic
searching for "acceptable" fetal tissue for what was to become the first fetal
tissue transplant.
During this time, Dr. Freed was " examining and
reassembling fetal remains to be sure abortions were complete, a task
For Bopp, such actions
normally performed by clinic personnel.'"
represent clear participation in and agreement with the abortion procedure
itself, no different from the complicity of the German doctors in the death
of camp prisoners.

Role of Intermediary
In his article, Childress refers to the finding of the Polkinghorne
report (in the U.K.) which called for the introduction of an " intermediary"
collector or processor as a "method to separate the practice of abortion
from the use of fetal tissue ." 4 But Bopp contends that such a provision
would not eliminate the complicity of the researcher. If the act itself is an
immoral one, then the provision of a middle man does not create " a break
in the chain of ethical respon sibility"S in the same way that the hiring of a
"hit man" does not break the chain of ethical responsibility for the person
who hires him for the purpose of murder.
Childress notes that James Burtchaell (another dissenting panel
member) perceives moral complicity in an agent whose actions "involve an
association that both yields benefits and conveys approval. Even if the
agent expressly condemn s the wrong actions, his or her association
symbolically eviscerates those condemnations.,,6 Burtchaell holds that the
researcher, in "entering into an institutionalized partnership with the
abortion industry as a suppl ier of reference .. . becomes compl icit, though
after the fact, with the abortions that have expropriated the ti ssue for his or
her purposes."? For his part, Childress attempts to show the unworkability
of this definition (in a kind of reductio ad absurdum) by widening the scope
of this " institutionalized" symbolic association and speculating that,
according to Bopp and Burtchaell, everyone from transplant recipients to
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taxpayers would somehow be complicitous in the federally-funded practice
of HFTTR. John Robertson (a majority report signatory) makes a similar
claim by extending this "complicity" to the grocer who sells food to the
abortionist. This argument patently ignores the all-important criterion of
proximate cause. Bopp points out that there is a substantial difference
between the grocer who accepts everyone ' s money (including the
abortionist) and the researcher who is " logically proximate" to those
performing the abortion. Moreover, it would be a more apt analogy if the
grocer were the recipient of illegal liquor (e.g ., moonshine) from a criminal
via a middle man. The grocer would then be complicitous with criminal
activity if he were to knowingly sell the liquor.
Robertson points to the example of body parts and organs which
are obtained from murder and accident victims and attempts to outline a
s
parallel with the researcher collecting fetal tissue from an aborted child.
According to Bopp, thi s analogy is flawed since it does not imply any
approval of murder for the doctor to use the organs of a murder victim. If
the doctor had knowledge of the murder in advance or had some
arrangement with a serial murderer to receive the bodies of his victims,
then a clear charge of complicity would apply here. But as he is unaware
of the action s of the murderer, he must surely be innocent of any
cooperation with those actions. Unlike abortion , murder is not a regulated,
approved and predictable practice. It remains a random , though brutal,
action (accidents are similarly unpredictable and random) . But, as Bopp
theorizes, what if this were not so? What if one could know when and
where a murder was about to occur and could arrange to collect the bodies
afterwards?
He asks: " What if the murderer were known, and an
intermediary rented space in a building owned by the murderer in order to
more efficiently collect and process human tissue?,,9 In these cases (among
others) the complicity would be clear and the analogy with abortion proven.
Additionally, the law might declare murder to be legal, posing the troubling
question : " Would the fact that the practice is not proscribed by law make it
j usti ftable?" I 0

Legality and Morality
This excessive reliance on legality as the basis of morality is what
led the authors of the majority report to deny that there was any valid
analogy between the medical use of Holocaust victims ' bodies and the
practice of abortion for transplant purposes: " If the complicity claim is
doubtful when the underlying immorality of the act is clear, as with Naziproduced data or transplants from murder victims, it is considerably
weakened when the act making the benefit possible is legal and its
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immorality is vigorously debated, as is the case with abortion." JJ Thus the
mistake of elevating "legal" acts (in the " hierarchy" of morality) over those
which are "vigorously debated" is painfully demonstrated when one
considers that the Nazi regime considered all that it did to be in full accord
with its own law. Nor is it the case that Nazi eugenic and social
experiments are beyond "vigorous debate", even today. The existence of
those who adhere to anti-semetic, eugenic or neo-Nazi beliefs testifies to
that regrettable fact.
The majority vigorously objected to comparisons between the Nazi
death camp regime and the practice of fetal tissue transplantation . Dr.
Moscona forcefully asserted: "The Holocaust was not a medical research
project to help Parkinson patients and rescue infants from fatal diseases." J2
In reply to this, one must remember that the Nazis themselves did believe
that their actions would benefit German society through what Bopp calls
"racial hygienics." Thus it is far too simplistic to view those experiments
as nothing more than an exercise in cruelty. Those German doctors, like
the researchers of today, would have vehemently denied that they possessed
anything other than altruistic motives, and this is perhaps the most chilling
aspect of their crimes. Moscona also believes that the central objective of
the Nazis was not the implementation of experimental " cruelties" but the
ideology which "denied human freedom and enslaved it to medieval hatreds
in the name of world conquest" J3 and which "[denied] human rights to one
class of citizens, unlocked oppression and provided the warrant for
genocide." J4 But similarly no one would maintain that the objective of the
abortion movement is the procuring of fresh tissue for transplantation.
Rather, it is the realization of an ideology which denies human rights to a
class of citizens (i.e., the unborn) and treats humans as expendable in the
name of some greater societal " good ." The Nazi analogy is thus both
accurate and appropriate. For Moscana, " Equating freely surrendered
abortus cells with tormented people poi soned with lethal insecticides defies
reason and outrages morality." JS Here, he has confused the role of the
subjects by asserting that the " cells" are freely surrendered . But by whom?
Not by the unborn fetus , certainly, who is forcibly poisoned by lethal
substances of another kind. Thus the denial of the analogy is once again in
vain.

Effect of Fetal Tissue Transplants on Abortion Decisions
The panel also considered the possible effects of the avai labi I ity of
fetal tissue transplants on the decision of a woman to obtain an abortion .
The majority believed that it was possible to separate these two factors
through a system of legal sanctions and regulations which would remove
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the incentives to seek an abortion for transplant purposes. Robertson
argues that the provision of federal funding for fetal tissue harvesting
would not convey an approval of abortion , any more than the funding of
kidney transplants encourages the occurrence of murder, suicide or
accidents. However, a critical di stinction exists here: Whereas the above
three phenomena are by no means approved of by society (recent legal
changes in Oregon notwithstanding), the practice of abortion is not only
tolerated but has been actively encouraged through the law since the Roe v.
Wade decision of 1973. Therefore, as Bopp observes, the lack of legal
restraints against the practice " makes the moral wrong of abortion
susceptible to promotion. ,, '6 The panel seems to believe that federal
funding of the tissue collection process would be the best way to insure the
separation (what they call " a symbolic gulf') between the decision to abort
and the decision to provide fetal tissue. Closely regulated , they argue, the
HFTTR process is value-neutral. It neither approves nor disapproves of the
practice of abortion but merely makes use of fetuses which were destined to
be destroyed anyway. Under the panel ' s guidelines, a woman would not be
asked for her consent to donate to donate fetal tissue until she had decided
to obtain an abortion: " no information about the donation and use of fetal
tissue in research should be provided prior to the pregnant woman's
decision to abort, unless she specifically requests that information .,, ' 7 This
provision, along with others which stipulate that " no fees [should] be paid
to the woman to donate [fetal tissue]"' 8 is aimed at preventing abortions
which would not have otherwise occurred. The naivete of this belief
becomes evident when one considers both the difficulty of identifying any
one " moment of decision" and the factors involved in the decision to abort.
Bopp cites many studies which show that " most women are ambivalent
about abortion .. . a large percentage of women end up changing their minds
at least once, with five percent doing so after making the abortion
appointment.,, '9 A study by Kathleen Nolan has found that since " women
do take the perceived needs of others into account, as a major and often
determinative factor, the potential for influence on individual [elective
abortion] decisions is real." Thus, the general knowledge of the existence
of the procedure may well tip the balance in favor of abortion, a fact
implicitly recognized by Childress when he accepts that HFTTR " may
reduce feelings of guilt and tragedy"}O associated with abortion. He relates
the story of a phone call from a man whose wife was about to have an
abortion. They wanted, he said, to donate fetal tissue in order to " reduce
their troublesome thought about abortion .,,21 Though Childress is unclear
as to the motives of the woman in question, it is not difficult to see how
other women in the emotional upheaval of crisis pregnancy may well seek
an "altruistic" solution as a way of lessening deep feelings of unease and
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guilt. Substantial research on post-abortion patients, such as that conducted
by David Reardon (author of the excellent Aborted Women, Silent No
More) shows that many women do not feel that they were sufficiently
informed or free of pressure when they made their abortion decision . In
light of this, the panel's implied view of abortion as a clearly defined and
emotionally uncomplicated choice strikes one as singularly ill-informed.

Parental Authority
In spite of the concerns raised by the dissent, the panel majority
believed that the method of express donation (as opposed to " presumed"
donation) enacted by the pregnant woman after the abortion decision was
most appropriate to society ' s traditions and practices, e.g., the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act and other federal research stipulations. Bopp and
Burtchaell opposed this finding, believing that when a pregnant woman
"resolves to destroy her offspring, she has abdicated her office and duty as
the guardian of her offspring, and thereby forfeits her tutelary powers."n
The majority objected that the decision to abort does not automatically
invalidate the mother's moral standing "as the primary decisionmaker about
the disposition of fetal remains, including the donation of fetal tissue for
research.,,23 Thus, despite the fact that she directly intends the death of her
unborn child, "she still has a special connection with the fetus and she has a
legitimate interest in its disposition and use.,,14 The panel cited legal
examples where parents who are suspected of or have admitted to the death
of their child by abuse are permitted to make proxy decisions regarding use
of that child ' s organs. Without addressing this latter claim (which is
difficult to judge because of its un specific nature) it seems difficult to
justify the notion of " legitimate interest" in the case of a mother who has
chosen to abort. The law (and moral law) clearly does not consider
parenthood an absolute " right" , independent of all other considerations.
Rather, it is a sacred trust which depends for its legitimacy on the maxim
(enunciated by Hadley Arkes in The Fetal Tissue Issue) that all " [parental]
decisions are governed by an overriding concern for the health and wellbeing of the child .,,25 Hence, the legal system can supersede parental
authority to provide life-saving procedures when necessary and the moral
law can declare illicit any attempt to conceive children outside of the
marital act. Both underscore the belief that the rights of parenthood are
contingent on the welfare of the child .
Hadley Arkes argues cogently that a mother who has decided to
abort has weighed her personal interests against those of her child and
determined that her interests have overridden any claim on the part of her
child to preserve its life. According to Arkes, " it would seem to be clear
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beyond shading that the woman has made a decision not to be a 'mother' in
any sense that defines the office and the relation. ,,26 She will not allow the
child to be born, sustained, nurtured or protected. Nor will she allow others
to provide that care. Arkes finds it hard to imagine " a situation in which a
woman would sever more decisively her connections to the child and the
claim to stand, in the life of that child, in the position of a " mother" or even
a guardian .,,27 Yet this claim is precisely what the panel majority would
uphold via the significance they attach to the " special connection" between
the mother and the child she is about to destroy. On the contrary, Arkes
maintains, the mother has the authority to make a " gift" of her miscarried
child's tissue only because her intentions were always directed towards the
health and well-being of that child while it was alive. Arkes notes that the
conclusion that a mother can forfeit the right of donation through her
abortion decision may seem "a bit jarringly out of line with the currents of
our time,,28 but observes that the " currents of our time" are themselves
somewhat bizarre. The era of Roe v Wade , euthanasia and organ transplant
developments has seen the emergence of the notion of property rights over
another's body and over its disposal. These rights, which were not
recognized at the time of Blackstone (theft of a corpse was considered " no
felony, unless some of the gravecloths be stolen with it,,29) are now widely
debated and legislated for. Of significance in this debate is the person ' s
reasonable rights of property over hi s own person, "which Locke regarded
as the foundation of all other claims of property.,,·10 Neither are these rights
lost at death, a fact which often escapes those who regard the deceased
fetus as a "commodity." "The source of rights . .. must lie in principles that
are not material in nature. Those rights do not vanish upon death because
the principles themselves do not decompose. ".1 1

The Need for Fetal Tissue Transplant Research
In spite of the arguments outlined above, proponents of HFTTR
justify its implementation on the basis that there simply exists too great a
human need for such transplants for research to be halted. In truth, it
cannot be denied that research (even of an immoral nature) may indeed
give rise to medical cures and treatments (e.g. for Parkinson ' s and
Alzheimer' s diseases and certain spinal cord injuries) which are of benefit
to society. Clearly, the panel believed that the risk that new abortions
would be caused by the availability of HFTTR was acceptably low and that
the promised medical benefits outweighed that risk. What exists here is an
unfortunate example of proportionalist reasoning which attempts to
measure the value of human lives lost against the promised benefits of
HFTTR. The truth of this was grasped by the U.S. Assistant Secretary for
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Health when he recognized that the risk that one more unborn life would be
taken was too high a price to pay fOor such benefits: " If just one additional
fetus were lost because of the allure of directly benefiting another life by
the donation of fetal tissue, our department would still be against federal
funding ... ,,32 (Predictably, Childress rejects the " moral seriousness" of this
claim and instead blames the increase in abortions on those who fail to
provide sex education, contraceptive and psychosocial support for pregnant
women.) Indeed, there is much to suggest that the risk to unborn life from
abortion-related H FTTR is far greater than simply one more abortion.
Despite the panel's high-minded aversion to the sale or purchase of fetal
tissue, the indications are that trafficking in such tissue has already become
widespread and can only increase as governments and ethical bodies confer
approval on the process itself (albeit for "non-profit" purposes). Arkes
remarks that even when state laws may forbid the expl icit " sale" of tissue,
" it will still be necessary to pay for the procedures and administration, and
the transactions may be described . .. as "renditions of service ' " .13 with
clinics offering cheaper abortions in exchange for much needed fetal
material.
Former abortion doctor (turned pro-life activist) Bernard
Nathanson has observed that " a mother may not sell her aborted fetus. but
that will be no bar to other economic benefits disguised as part of the
procedure (just as happens with ' free-markef adoptions now).,, 14 Childress
admits that under the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA - which
forbids the "sale" of fetuses under a 1988 amendment), provision is made
for the reimbursment of abortion clinics for expenses incurred in collecting
fetal tissue. This gives rise to " some uncertainty" as to whether the clinic
"can then reduce the price of the abortion. thereby passing the earnings on
to the pregnant woman.,,35 In his autobiographical work The Hand of God,
Nathanson reminds his readers that the cost of fetal tissue therapy (for
Parkinson's disease to take but one example) would be far from cheap.
Requisite procedures must include screening of patients for their suitability
for the technique, carrying out of abortions, icing and transportation of
freshly-aborted fetuses, examination of fetal tissues, procedures connected
with the transplant operation itself, and follow-up diagnosis. The estimated
cost of such a procedure would be at least $50,000 and there could be as
many as 5 million potential recipients on the waiting list, yielding a total
cost of $250 billion. He concludes that this is ample incentive for a
massive increase in the marketing of human fetuses and that it would be
"preposterous to believe that a ban on ' commercialization ' of fetal ti ssue
would (a.) remove the profit motive from this technology, (b.) reduce the
demand for the technology , [or] (c.) . .. sanitize the technology ethically.",6
It is clear that this testimony, from a doctor who reaped substantial
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financial rewards from the abortion industry himse lf, represents a more
sanguine, rea li stic assessment of the potential hazards of fetal tissue
transplants than th e overly optimi sti c hopes of th e HFTTR panel. In
addition , Professor Ronald Munson points out that th e 1988 amendment to
NOTA, referred to above, co uld eas ily be repealed if further research into
fetal cell therapy proves success ful :17 It should be noted that thi s unease
does not come from pro-life circles alone. Kate Michaclman of the
National Abortion Ri ghts Action League has already declared that he sees
"a potential for the abuse of wo men in thi s whole thin g.,,18 It remai ns clear
that onl y strict legal and ethi ca l disapproval of abo rti on-related HFTTR can
prevent the specter of a world wide market in th e harvest ing o f fetu ses.
Unfortunately, the panel appeared si ngularly unwilling to convey thi s
di sapprova l.
Morally Acceptable Methods of Tissue Collection?

In view of the dan ge r posed to unborn life by th e many illicit ways
of collecting fetal tissue, is it possib le to speak of alternati ve, morally
justifiable ways of doing so? Dr. Maria Michejda, who has done extensive
research on miscarried fetuses at Georgetown University, believes it is.
She argues that, although th e research so far has been disproportionately
biased in favor of abortion-produced fetal ti ss ue, th ere are clea r reasons for
using tissue from mi scarri ages. One of th ese is th e fact that "tissue
harvested from electively aborted fetuse s [i s] hi ghl y contaminated (75%)
due to th e methods of abortive interve ntion and th e rapid ex pUl sion of the
fetus with the resulting rupture of the fetal abdominal wa ll and other
surface areas.,,·19 Furthermore, because miscarriages can occur at any time
during pregnancy, they prov ide bett er exa mples of ti ss ue from all periods
of gestation than cells from abortions, most of whic h are performed in th e
first trimester.
Based on her studi es condu cted into fetal ti ssue
procurement, Dr. Michejda also believes th at ti ss ue obta ined from
miscarri ages will prove in the long run to be more med ica ll y viab le than
aborted ti ssue. Predicting that th e adve nt of abortion drugs will diminish
the availability of electively aborted ti ssue, she asserts that th e time is right
to establi sh a collection network devoted exclusively to harvestin g fetal
tissue from miscarriages. Moreover, Pres ident Clinton' s 1993 li ftin g of the
moratorium on fetal ti ssue research and th e concom itant restorati on of
federal funding for such research wo uld seem to highlight th e need for a
systematic deve lopment of a morally lic it method of ti ss ue co llec ti on as a
way of reducing the demand for abortion-related ti ss ue. While thi s
collection may be morally permi ss ible beca use of its non-re liance on the
abortion procedure, it is ev ident that great caution must still be exerci sed in
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the establishment and maintenance of fetal tissue "banks ." Dr. Michejda
believes that " fetal tissue transplantation offers many exciting, therapeutic
prospects,,40 and the quest for morally acceptable alternatives to abortionrelated transplants may indeed present to the scientist many fascinating
avenues of research. Nevertheless, in a society and industry dominated by
abortion advocates, stringent standards must regulate the approval of such
tissue banks in order to prevent the semblance of a corresponding approval
of a "harvesting" mentality. Dr. Michejda accepts the need for such
controls on sound bioethical grounds which would regulate such practices.
These controls would have to take account of the fact that the growth of
tissue banks is not immune from the influence of market forces which tend
to commercialize anything with a cost value. In addition, one would have
to examine critically the potential of such storage to create a demand which
may, because of some future shortage, seek its corresponding supply
elsewhere in less ethical circumstances. Noted moral theologian Fr.
Ronald Lawler poses this important question: "Is there much likelihood
that ... the demand for fetal tissue would be so great that there would be
almost unanswerable demands for fetal tissue, far more than could be
satisfied by miscarriages?,,4 1 While accepting that the goods pursued in
research are very great, he urges any prospective researcher to bear the
following in mind: " the fact that great goods may be reached by such a
project does not finally determine that it is a good one.,,42

Conclusion
Dr. Michejda observes that "the recent rapid progress in biological
sciences, and in the new therapies, which emerged from them , has moved
ahead of the currently accepted ethical guidelines.,,43 It is therefore
imperative that the new ethical and moral guidelines do not merely attempt
to "catch up" with new therapies but critically examine them , both for their
immediate effects and the impressions of approval which they convey to
society. In this respect the Church , with its deeply-rooted understanding of
the integrity of the human body from conception until death (and after
death), seems uniquely suited to the task of keeping in view before the
medical and ethical communities the inestimable dignity of man and the
respect which he deserves as they seek to formulate their guidelines. Fr.
Ronald Lawler' s observations are again insightful in this regard : " For love
requires both that we act out of generous love, seeking to help others
flourish in good , and also that we pursue what is good in ways that do no
intrinsically evil deeds, nor bring about irresponsibly measures of harm that
in the circumstances we have a duty not to bring about. "44 In this dual
action, then , lies the essence of true Christian charity, which must of
August, 1999

31

necessity be the cornerstone of any ethical framework governing the use of
fetal tissue transplants. Only in this way can these tran plants truly serve
the flourishing of human goods by respecting the intrinsic dignity of the
donor while simultaneously demon strating compassionate concern for the
alleviation of human suffering. Failure to recognize thi s can only serve to
reduce persons, both donor and recipient, to the humiliating status of
"producer" and "consumer" and to ultimately degrade the nobility of
scientific research itself.

References
I. James F. Childress, " Ethics, Public Policy and Human Fetal Tissue
Transplantation Research" in Bioelhics (ed. Thomas Shannon), p. 437.
2. James Bopp, Jr. , "Fetal Tissue Transplantation and Moral Complicity with
Induced Abortion" in The Fetal Tissue Issue (Cataldo/Moraczewski. eds.), P. 64 .
3. Ibid., p. 64 .
4. Childress, p. 456.
5. Bopp, p. 65.
6. Childress, p. 441.
7. Ibid., p. 441 ; Bopp/Burtchael1 (HFTT R dissent 1988). p. 70.
8. cf. Robertson 1988a, p. 31 ; Childress. p. 442.
9. Bopp, p. 66.
10. Ibid ., p. 67.
II. Ibid. , p. 67; Robertson , (HFTTR majority 1988), p. 453.
12. Ibid., p. 68; Moscona, (HFTTR majority 1988), p. 27-28 .
13 . Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.

32

Linacre Quarterly

16. Bopp, p. 71.
17 . Childress, p. 454; Report of the HFTTR Panel 1988, I: 10.
18 . Ibid ., p. 446; Report of the HFTT R Pane l 1988, 1:9.
19. Bopp, P. 72.
20. Childress, p. 445 .
2 1. Ibid ., p. 448.

22. Childress, p. 451 ; Bopp/ Burtchae l1 (HFTTR dissent 1988), p. 47.
23 . Ibid .; Report of the HFTT R Pane l 1988, 1:6 .
24. Ibid .; Report of the HFTTR Pane l 1988, 1:6.
25. Hadley Arkes, " Fetal Tissue and the Question of Consent" in The Fe/al Tissue
Issue, p. 22 .
26. Arkes, p. 22.
27. Ibid ., p. 22.
28. Ibid ., p. 25 .
29. Ibid ., p. 23; Blackstone, ed. 1979 (orig inal 1769):2 16.
30. Ibid ., p. 24.
3 1. Ibid., p. 24.
32 . Childress, p. 448.
33 . Arkes, p. 30.
34. Bernard Nathanson, The Hand (?lGod, p. 169.
35 . Childress, p. 446.
36. Nathanson , p. 166.
37 . cf. Rona ld Munson. In/ervention and Refl ection-Basic Issues in Medical EthiCS,
p. 523.

August, 1999

33

38. Ibid ., p. 524.
39. Mari a Michejda, " Fetal Ti ssue Transpl antation: Mi scarriages and Ti ssue
Banks" in The Fetal Tissue Issue, p. 9.
40 . Ibid ., p. 4.

4 1. Rev. Ronald Law ler, O.F. M. Cap., "The Good Things Sought in the Fetal
Tiss ue Project: Should Catholi c In stitutions Cooperate in thi s Pl an" in The Fetal
Tiss lle Issue. p. 9.
42. Ibi d. , p. 176 .
43. Mi chej da, p. 12.
44. Lawl er, p. 17 1.

34

Linacre Quarterly

